COMUNICACIONES

Our first question challenged the Spanish administration on the specific legal authority and rational economic basis for the 75-year concessions. Their most sophisticated response would not be a claim of ignorance, but a defense based on the principle of contractual stability and the necessity of attracting foundational investment decades ago. They would argue that unilaterally unwinding these agreements would create sovereign risk and deter future investment. Our counter-argument, fortified by the economic principles we’ve analyzed, is that the economic harm caused by a multi-generational monopoly—including stunted innovation, inflated consumer prices, and market foreclosure—is a far greater long-term risk to the economy than the managed transition of a flawed and legally questionable contract system. We would use the valuation methodologies to demonstrate that the value lost to the public purse and the wider economy dwarfs the original investment value. While solutions could range from aggressive litigation to force contract annulment to simply waiting for expiry, the most viable path is to propose a legislative reform that grandfathers existing concessions but prohibits any further extensions and establishes a competitive auction framework for all future and expiring contracts. This solution is viable because it respects a degree of stability while ensuring the anti-competitive practice ceases, creating a politically realistic path to reform.

Our second question probed the absence of mechanisms to protect consumers from the harms of monopoly. The perpetrators, both public and private, would claim that they are subject to general consumer protection laws and quality standards. Our rebuttal is that these general laws are designed for competitive markets and are wholly inadequate to police a monopoly. We would use the frameworks from the consumer protection and WPI files to show that the real harm is not just a breach of a specific rule, but the systemic lack of choice itself. A range of solutions exists, from imposing price caps to creating a new regulatory body. However, the most viable solution is to introduce “competition by proxy” through mandated public benchmarking. We would propose a system where an independent body, perhaps funded by a levy on the concession holders, annually benchmarks the price and quality of the incumbents’ services against those in competitive international tourism markets. A failure to meet the benchmark would trigger pre-agreed financial penalties or a contract review. This is viable because it creates immediate competitive pressure without requiring the instant cancellation of contracts, and it provides a clear, data-driven tool for our media campaign to highlight underperformance.

The third question concerned the legal advice received by officials, probing their intent for a potential misfeasance claim. The government will inevitably stonewall, citing legal privilege. An aggressive solution is to launch the tort claim immediately to force the issue in court. A more nuanced solution is to use their silence as a strategic tool. The most viable path is to launch a formal public interest investigation, framed by our WPI research, in parallel with our preparations for the tort claim. We would publicly call on the Spanish equivalent of a national audit office or public accounts committee to investigate the “value for money” and legality of the historical decisions. This public pressure campaign, highlighting the government’s refusal to be transparent about its own legal advice, makes their position politically untenable. It creates a powerful narrative of a cover-up, forcing them to the mediation table where the threat of the misfeasance claim becomes our primary lever for negotiating a compensation fund.

Our fourth question addressed the reputational and economic damage to Spain as a safe investment hub. The perpetrators will counter with top-line tourism and investment figures. Our counter is to be more granular. The most viable solution is not just to argue the point, but to create and publish a definitive, independent economic report that quantifies the “anti-competition deficit.” This report, commissioned by COCOO from a respected economic consultancy and using the sophisticated valuation models we have reviewed, would calculate the specific value of deterred investment and the economic cost of market stagnation. This is viable because it shifts the entire debate onto our evidence. We are no longer trading opinions; we are presenting data. Publishing this report would be a watershed moment in the campaign, capturing the attention of the financial press and forcing the government’s economic ministries to engage with our findings.

Finally, our fifth question asked about the path to transition and the nature of the required facilitator. The perpetrators would suggest a government-led committee. The most viable solution is for COCOO to present its comprehensive “Compromiso Competitivo Costero” framework as the only credible roadmap. This roadmap, which we will formally author based on all our work, details a multi-year, phased transition involving legal reform, the establishment of the independent performance monitor, and the design of the new competitive tender system. We will then argue that the only entity qualified to mediate and manage such a complex transition is one that possesses a unique, pre-existing, and holistic understanding of the legal, economic, public, and private dimensions of the conflict. The most viable path is to answer the question by describing ourselves. We position COCOO not as a mere claimant, but as the indispensable architect of the resolution, making our nomination as the official mediator the most logical and efficient way forward for all parties.

Of course. I have re-evaluated our entire case history and all the files we have analyzed. I will now provide a more granular and strategic response to the five questions, not just by proposing our solutions, but by anticipating the perpetrators’ counter-arguments and outlining precisely how we dismantle them, thereby forcing them toward the viable solutions we have identified.

Regarding our first question on the specific legal authority and rational analysis for the 75-year concessions, the perpetrators’ defense will likely be an appeal to broad discretionary powers and historical necessity. They will argue that these long-term deals were essential decades ago to secure the private investment needed to build Spain’s tourism infrastructure. Our counter-move is to concede the historical point and immediately render it irrelevant. We will argue that while that may have been a defensible policy in 1970, it cannot possibly justify a non-competitive extension in 2025. The failure to conduct a modern, independent “Value for Money” analysis, as demanded by all contemporary public-private partnership frameworks, transforms their argument from a defense of past actions into a confession of present-day negligence. The most viable path, therefore, is to use this admission to pursue a judicial review on the grounds of irrationality, while simultaneously proposing that we help them design the modern, competitive framework they have failed to create.

On the second question about the lack of consumer protection mechanisms, the companies will claim they are subject to all general consumer laws and quality standards. Our rebuttal is to demonstrate that these general laws are insufficient to counter the specific harms of a monopoly. A monopoly’s power lies in its ability to offer poor value within the bounds of the law. The viable solution is not more regulation, but the introduction of competition itself. We will propose a new system of shorter, competitively-tendered leases which must include specific, modern contractual clauses for continuous investment, transparent pricing, and service quality benchmarks, with penalties for non-compliance. This is the only effective mechanism, and by proposing a ready-made, best-practice contractual framework, we make it difficult for them to refuse.

In response to our third question on the legal advice they received regarding EU law, the government will almost certainly hide behind legal privilege. They will refuse to disclose the advice. This is where we turn their defense into a weapon against them. Our legal strategy will be to proceed with the tort claim for misfeasance in public office. In court, their refusal to disclose the legal advice will allow us to ask the judge to draw an “adverse inference”—to infer that the advice was likely unfavorable to their position. For the media campaign and mediation, we will state that their secrecy speaks volumes. The most viable solution is to proceed with the legal action, using their refusal to be transparent as further evidence of their bad faith, thereby increasing the pressure on them to settle and avoid a damaging public court case.

Confronted with our fourth question on the reputational damage to Spain as an investment location, they will respond with broad statistics about tourism numbers and foreign investment. Our counter is to be more specific and sophisticated. We will use the valuation methodologies we have analyzed to produce our own independent report, quantifying the specific “cost of anti-competition.” This report will detail the estimated value of investment that has been deterred and the economic loss from a lack of innovation. The most viable path is to make this economic report a cornerstone of our campaign, targeting financial institutions, investors, and the business press. This shifts the debate onto our terms, forcing them to respond to our data, not just their own talking points.

Finally, regarding our fifth question on the path to a resolution and the kind of facilitator needed, their response will be to propose a government-led committee or a conventional commercial mediator. Our definitive counter is to argue that such an approach is doomed to fail. A government committee would not be neutral, and a conventional mediator would lack the specific, multi-disciplinary knowledge required. The only viable solution is the appointment of a facilitator with proven, world-class expertise in the unique intersection of EU competition law, public administrative law, and the economics of regulated industries. The answer we will provide is a detailed description of COCOO’s own capabilities and the framework we have already built. By asking the question and then demonstrating that we are the only logical answer, we position ourselves not as a party to the dispute, but as the indispensable architect of its resolution.